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apoleon is sometimes quoted as saying “When
China awakes, the world will tremble” or, as a
variant, “When the sleeping dragon awakes, it will
shake the world”. China is well and truly awake, to
the sound of the pattering feet of many little drag-
ons: SMEs. Many of these SMEs are internation-
alised. This paper explores three converging and
interrelated phenomena.
First,WTO statistics suggest that by 2006 China had
already overtaken the United States as the second
largest exporter in the world in terms of export vol-
ume, and will overtake Germany in the next year or
so to be the leading exporting country in the world
(WTO 2007).China has achieved remarkable growth
of exports and GDP in the last two decades. The
internationalisation of its economy is important to
its growth and to the stability of the region and the
world.
Second, most of these exports come from SMEs.
SMEs contribute 68 percent of China’s exports.This
is a much higher proportion than in any other econ-
omy in the OECD or APEC. China’s export growth
is about double its GDP growth. Chinese SME
exporters are a major contributor to Chinese eco-
nomic growth.
Third, most of these SMEs were “born” in the last
decade. China has created more SMEs in the last
20 years than the total number of SMEs in Europe
and the United States combined.It was only with the
opening of the private economy in China in the
reforms of 1980s by Deng Xiaoping that private
SMEs were recognised at all. Ten years later, in the
1990s, officially at least, China had only about one
million private sector SMEs, but it now officially
recognises about 40 million. It still falls short in that
it should have about 60 million if it is to have a nor-
mal density of entrepreneurs.
Together these three factors suggest that the world
may well shake to the march of an army of Chinese
SMEs, but in jubilation or in fear? This paper
explores:
• the rising importance of SMEs in China’s interna-
tionalisation;
• why Chinese SMEs have become such an interna-
tional force;
• whether the trends are likely to continue; and
briefly,
• the implications for Europe.
The rising importance of SMEs in China’s
internationalisation
The number of SMEs in China has grown rapidly
since the economic reforms of the early 1980s, which
led to a more market-based economy. However,
finding out how many SMEs there are in China is
not an easy task. There are two issues. The first is
how to define an SME and the second is whether it
is privately owned or not.
First, the definition of an SME in China is quite
complex and can include relatively large firms. In
OECD and APEC economies, the definition of an
SME also varies,but most commonly is based on the
number of employees. Usually an SME employs
fewer than 100 employees,with a maximum of about
500.In reality,the vast bulk of SMEs,around 70 per-
cent or so,employ fewer than five people or are self-
employed people.The definition used for regulatory
purposes (and thus for the collection of statistics on
SME exports) in China depends on the industry cat-
egory and is defined in terms of employees, sales
and assets. For example, an industrial SME is
defined as having up to 2,000 employees, while a
small business has less than 300, and a medium-size
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Consequently, what is regarded an SME in China
may be quite large relative to an SME in Europe or
the US.However,the labour intensity of production
and the huge size of China still make these firms rel-
atively small. Further, the definition of an SME in
China has also been changed at least four times
since the 1950s, which renders comparisons over
time difficult.
Second is the issue of private ownership. In western
economies, SMEs are usually privately owned and
run by the proprietor. In China, from the 1948
change of government until the Deng Xiaoping
reforms, which commenced in the early 1980s, pri-
vate sector firms did not officially exist. Most SMEs
were usually Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs),
which could be quite large. These were not state
owned nor were they really private in a western
sense;for example,they might be collectively owned,
with the state still having some role.
On the best information available, China had about
8.6 million non-agricultural SMEs in 1990, and this
has actually declined as a result of reforms (Chen et
al.2000).In 1995 there were about 7 million SMEs of
this type employing about 119 million of a total of
143 million employed by all industrial enterprises
(China 1995). Most of these so-called SMEs were
actually state owned enterprises; some of them were
quite largeand by their nature more bureaucratic
than entrepreneurial.
The private sector grew very rapidly over two
decades from 1980, and much of this growth was in
SMEs which were privately owned. Under China’s
statistical collection methods it is not usually possi-
ble to get the breakdown by size and by ownership
(for example, private sector versus state owned, by
size of firm). According to the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) data, the
number of private sector firms grew from zero in
1980 to about 100,000 in 1990,to 3.65 million in 2004,
or an average growth of about 30 percent per
annum. However, the Chinese Bureau’s of Statistics
(CBS) first Economic Census, completed in 2006
(China 2006),arrived at a figure of 39 million private
sector SMEs in 2004 or more than ten times the
NDRC estimate.The difference is explained by a dif-
ferent definition and collection methodology; for
example,the CBS included firms with less than eight
employees in its collection as well as non-employing
firms, which the NRDC did not. The CBS figure is
probably more representative of the real number of
SMEs in China.
Contrast this with a figure of about 19 million SMEs
in Europe (European Commission 2003) which
includes micro-firms and self-employed, and about 6
million in the US, or about 16 million if self-
employed people are included. This means that the
US and Europe combined account for about 35 mil-
lion SMEs relative to about 40 million in China
alone. However, almost all of the Chinese SMEs
have been born in the last ten years. This explosion
of entrepreneurial businesses is unprecedented in
human history.
What international contribution do these SMEs
make to the Chinese economy? The official Chinese
estimates of the contribution of SMEs to exports are
set out in Table 1. These show that from 2002, the
first year that SME exports were separately identi-
fied, SMEs contributed 62 percent of exports, grow-
ing to 68 percent in 2005. To put this in context,
Chinese SME exports were USD 518 billion in 2005,
or equivalent to about double the total GDP of
Greece, and about one quarter of the total GDP of
France.
These exporting Chinese SMEs include some firms
which are quite large relative to the normal defini-
tion of an SME in Europe or the US and include
firms which are not just privately owned firms.
However the same is true in Europe or the US, and
neither of those countries has accurate figures on
the level of SME exports at an international level
either. What figures there are (and ignoring inter-
state trade) probably suggest that SME exports are
less than 30 percent of all exports in the US and
Europe. European figures are hard to compare,
because they often contain a lot of intra-European
trade, so comparable only to beer being shipped
from Shandong to Yunnan, or bourbon from
Kentucky to California. However, a rough gauge
can be obtained from the European Commission
(2002) which estimated that European SMEs derive
only 13 percent of their turnover from exports.The
US Department of Commerce estimated that about
30 percent of US exports come from SMEs (Hall
2003). In rough terms, Chinese SMEs are more than
twice as internationalised as those US counterparts,
and more than five times as internationalised as
European SMEs.
To further put this in context,Figure 1 shows that the
level of Chinese exports, of which most come from
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SMEs, was greater than that of the US in late 2006.
Assuming the continued growth of Chinese exports
at 28 percent per annum relative to the 10 percent
per annum growth of exports in the US and Europe,
Chinese exports will exceed those of Europe, when
intra-European trade is excluded,some time in 2009.
China has also moved to having significant surpluses
in its balance of trade in the last year, both with the
US and Europe.
Why have Chinese SMEs become such an 
international force? 
In summary, Chinese SMEs have risen from almost
nothing to become a significant international eco-
nomic force in the last ten or fifteen years.Why has
this occurred? There has been little serious research
on this topic.The trend can be hypothesised to be a
result of a complex constellation of factors.
First, there is always a possibility that some of the
phenomenal growth in Chinese SMEs and their
exports is a mix of statistical manipulation or misun-
derstandings. In the past,
Chinese statistics have tended to
be part reality and part imagi-
nary. Statistics tended to be
reworked to meet the targets set
by the Central Committee. Con-
sequently, if a given level of
growth was a government target,
the statistics were massaged to
show that the growth target had
been achieved. In the case of the
SME figures this is unlikely to be
the case. China has always cited that SMEs make up
about 60 percent of its total exports.A similar figure
used to be quoted for Taiwan until the late 1990s,
when it was more correctly assessed at 28 percent of
exports coming from SMEs. The discrepancy arose
because of the way the statistics were calculated
(OECD 2004; Hall 2002). This may also be the case
in the mainland Chinese statistics, but even if the
estimates of the importance of SMEs in exports are
halved, they still make a very big contribution.
Further, that contribution by SMEs seems to be
increasing, in both relative and absolute terms.
Second, the reforms and the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) has meant that there are
many entrepreneurial opportunities available to
SMEs. As SOEs have closed down, the vacuum has
allowed entrepreneurial SMEs to flourish.For exam-
ple,Haier,one of the more successful Chinese white-
goods manufacturers, took over and turned a failing
SOE around,and it has since become a leading glob-
al exporter.
Third, up until the beginning of the 2000s, formal
finance was not readily available
to SMEs. Even official estimates
of non-performing loans (NPL)
in the banking sector were
around 30 percent of assets.This
situation arose because of loans
being directed on non-commer-
cial criteria (usually giving pref-
erential treatment to inefficient
SOEs), and then supported by a
policy of continuing automatic
roll-over of unpaid principal and
interest, forgiving of non-per-
forming loans, and the selective
use of below-market interest
rates. Lending rates to SMEs
were set by the central bank (the
Table 1 
Chinese exports and SME exports in billions USD 
  Total exports  SME exports  SME exports as % of total 
2002 438.23 272.48  62.3 
2003 593.32 390.44  65.8 
2004 761.99 518.16  68.0 
Sources: Data in SME exports and ratio of SME exports to total exports in 2003, 
2004, 2005 are adapted from Ministry of Commerce, cited in SME Briefing,   
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Figure 1People’s Bank of China – PBOC) and were set to be
artificially low for political rather than economic
reasons.This meant that the rates were not attractive
enough to encourage banks to lend to SMEs, espe-
cially when the banks had high NPLs. In the last five
years, changes to the financial regulation in China
have meant that more finance is available for SMEs.
This has mostly come through banks which lend
against collateral provided by credit guarantees,
which nominally relieves the bank of credit risk.
Accession to WTO status has helped by encouraging
international finance suppliers to set up in China and
by encouraging entry of foreign investors.
Fourth,the Chinese diaspora is large,often entrepre-
neurial and well educated.This entrepreneurialism is
not always by choice in many countries (Indonesia is
an example). Chinese have been prohibited from
government jobs or restricted and discriminated
against in their activities. In the last few decades
many Chinese have sought education abroad.
Attracted by the burgeoning opportunities, many of
these (foreign resident and also) foreign educated
Chinese have returned to China, and have set up
international businesses. For example, Vimicro,
which produces chips for cameras,was set up in 2004
by a small group of Chinese returning from the US
and has rapidly become a successful international
company.
Fifth, the vast supply of low-cost labour, especially
in the western provinces, and the regulation of the
exchange rate has kept many Chinese SMEs
extremely cost competitive. For example, the ILO
database gives the monthly rate for manufacturing
wages in China in 2004 as about 1,169 yuan per
month.Compare this with a German wage in manu-
facturing of about EUR 15 per hour. Allowing for
about 200 hours of work per month for a Chinese
worker, the Chinese wage is about 4 percent of the
German one.
Sixth, Chinese SMEs need to pursue foreign mar-
kets. Chinese domestic consumption is relatively
low, because domestic saving is high. China had a
huge savings pool, approximately 7.8 trillion yuan
(= USD 942 billion) as of February 2002, but at that
time most of this was apparently lying idle in banks.
Seventh, new technology has allowed many Chinese
to enter international business directly, so they are
less dependent on being part of large firm supply
chains. Typically, many Chinese businesses do not
have computers, but all have mobile phones, usually
3G phones, and those mobile phones can link
through high quality wireless broadband. In effect,
China’s SMEs have jumped over the copper infra-
structure to allow a more flexible and adaptable
approach to international opportunities.
Are these trends likely to continue?
In summary of the preceding,there are many factors
which have contributed to the unprecedented
growth and internationalisation of Chinese SMEs.
Will these trends continue apace? In short, it seems
likely they will, but with possible interruptions.
First, although officially China has 40 million SMEs,
it should have about 60 million, so the number of
SMEs is likely to further increase by about 50 per-
cent. This is based on an approximate estimate of
entrepreneurial density, observed in most developed
economies,of about 5 percent of the total population
being an owner-manager of an SME (Hall 2002).The
ratio in China has risen from about 0.08 percent in
1990,to about 3.3 percent in 2004.It is likely to move
to something around 5 percent in the next few years.
Casual observation in China shows that the start-up
rate of businesses is not decreasing.There is virtual-
ly no way that the Chinese government can now stop
the dragons that have been unleashed.
Second,there is,however,relatively little profession-
al management experience or legal infrastructure
available for these new SMEs. This absence will
cause hiccups and may slow the expansion. The fly-
ing-geese model of Akamatsu (1961) suggests that
the Chinese can develop faster than their predeces-
sors’ economies,because,like geese or bicycle racers,
the Chinese can ride on the bow wave of the leaders.
It took Europe about 800 years to go from a feudal
agricultural economy to a post-industrial economy.It
took North America a bit over 300 years to do the
same;America had the benefit of the knowledge and
mistakes learnt by Europe. It took Japan about
50 years to do the same, so each follower can take a
shorter time. China is attempting to take the same
journey in around 25 years, about the length of the
career of an average manager.Many of the managers
in China have never had any training in manage-
ment. Few have ever experienced a serious down-
turn in the economy.The legal and social infrastruc-
ture has not developed as quickly as the entrepre-
neurs have.The growth has been a wave that has car-
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ried everyone along. If and when a major downturn
does take place, many managers may simply not be
able to deal with it. Nor is the financial system likely
to be able to cope. Most of the credit guarantees are
provided by private sector operations, and there is a
real risk that in cases of major default, the guaran-
tors will not be able to meet their liabilities. These
guarantor organisations were established largely to
get around central government and PBOC restric-
tions on interest rates, and can provide little real
financial collateral.
Third, China faces some major structural and demo-
graphic changes in the coming years and decades.
For example, by 2025 about 35 percent of China’s
population will be over the age of 50, up from about
17 percent in 1995. The Chinese work environment,
the amount of smoking and the pollution levels
mean that many older Chinese have major health
problems. More old people will be depending on a
smaller working population to support them in their
“golden years”,especially as a result of the one child
policy. The working population, those in the age
bracket from 20 to 49 years, will fall as a percentage
of total population from about 48 percent in 1995 to
about 40 percent in 2025. The absolute number of
those of working age will peak at about 665 million
in 2010, and then decline to 597 million in 2025. In
2000, just around 70 percent of China’s population
were still living outside urban centres and only 30
percent were in towns and cities. In most developed
economies, urbanisation means a reversal of this
ratio. In China this may mean bringing half a billion
people into cities.These challenges will require infra-
structure and funding. Many SMEs (and SOEs) in
China treat paying taxes as optional. Many of the
larger SMEs (and some SOEs) are incorporated in
the Canary Islands, specifically for tax minimisation
purposes.
Fourth, China faces significant international diplo-
matic and economic pressures in respect of its bal-
ance of payments surpluses. At present, China
emphasises exchange rates over interest rates as its
primary monetary management tool. China has
engaged in a form of banded float since 2006, and
has allowed the slow appreciation of the yuan. The
PBOC does not fully sterilise the exchange interven-
tion used to slow the appreciation of the currency.
Consequently there are artificial competitive cost
advantages accruing to Chinese SMEs and addition-
al financial funds in the economy to support growth.
The appreciation of the yuan and the slow move to
full currency convertibility on capital account has
been recognised as inevitable in China for some
time.The real dispute is about the rate of change. If
the currency were to be corrected in a major way
(such as a sudden appreciation of 30 percent or so in
yuan to USD) in a short period, then it would cause
some disruption to Chinese SMEs and their interna-
tionalisation. However, it is really a matter of the
rate of change, and how fast the SMEs can struc-
turally adjust. It is unlikely to slow the rate of SME
expansion much, but it may alter the pattern.This is
already happening. For example, SMEs in the south
of China (Shen Zhen, Guangdong, Fujian, etc.) are
already adjusting their international activity to be
more competitive.They are doing this by shifting to
cheaper locations in and out of China, including
Africa and Eastern Europe, and in improving pro-
ductivity and quality in the face of rising costs.This is
just what Hong Kong did twenty years ago. SMEs
are remarkably adaptable animals, a sort of cha-
meleon dragon.
The implications for Europe
Napoleon’s concern was that China was a sleeping
dragon with a vast population, many of whom
lived in poverty. China thus had huge potential
military implications for the world. However, as it
awakes much of China’s energy is economic and
entrepreneurial, not military.The internationalisa-
tion of Chinese SMEs is both an opportunity and
a threat for Europe. The challenge is to create an
economic and political environment which is not a
zero-sum game, but which gives everyone oppor-
tunities to gain.
The threats to Europe posed by the internationalisa-
tion of Chinese SMEs are fairly obvious. The most
common manifestation of the threat is in the dis-
putes over textile exports from China to Europe,
within the broader threat of the trade surplus that
China holds against the US and Europe. Political
concerns are understandable,especially,for example,
for an employee or owner in a German SME with
statutory protections and excellent working condi-
tions. However, the threat will not go away, and it
will not be solved by accusations of dumping or
exchange rate complaints. These are just salves. The
real issue is one of structural adjustment and the rate
of structural change. Voters do not worry much
about a business closure if they know another firm
will be opening up,or expanding,just down the road.The more difficult issue is if one business is closing
down in their area, but opening up in another area
which is hard for them to move to, or if nothing else
is opening up at all.This adjustment process is not a
new phenomenon in Europe,as evidenced by empty
villages in Greece, for example, as a result of the
post-1940s migration to better jobs,or by the migra-
tion from Africa to Europe in search of jobs. It can
be a painful experience,and there is understandable
resistance to it.The clear implication is that Europe
will have to continue to go through structural ad-
justments, many of which will be driven by Chinese
SMEs.
The opportunities are less apparent, because the
structural changes are international and so are the
opportunities.SMEs make up about half of any local
or national economy (in employment and value
added terms), but historically their contribution to
the international economy has been much smaller.
SMEs only make up about 30 percent of trade across
borders, and about 10 percent of international
investment (Hall 2002). SMEs contribute dispropor-
tionately to net job creation: SMEs contribute about
70 percent of net new jobs,while larger firms tend to
be job destroyers. Politicians and bureaucrats have
been slow to realise the real significance of this in a
globalised economy. Many well ensconced business-
es in the West prefer to look to politicians for pro-
tection, rather than seek opportunities abroad.
Policies to assist SMEs to internationalise are often
just disguised subsidies to exporters. Chinese SMEs
have sketched out a new paradigm, where SMEs
have the same important role internationally as they
have domestically.This allows them to simultaneous-
ly provide an engine of job creation in China and
abroad. It is through this process that SMEs in
Europe could also add significantly to the total
amount of value added or GDP.
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